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Abstract
The point of the present study is to illustrate and, if possible, promote the existing link
between genomics and ethics, taking the example of cloned and transgenic animals.
These ‘new animals’ raise theoretical and practical problems that concern applied
ethics. We will explore more particularly an original strategy showing that it is
possible, starting from philosophical questioning about the nature of identity, to use
a genomic approach, based on ampliﬁcation fragment length polymorphism (AFLP)
and methylation-sensitive ampliﬁcation polymorphism (MSAP) detection, to provide
useful tools to deﬁne more rigorously what cloned animals are, by testing their genetic
and epigenetic identity. We expect from the future results of this combined approach
to stimulate the creativity of the philosophical and ethical reﬂection about the impact
of biotechnology on animals, and to increase scientiﬁc involvement in such issues.
Copyright  2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
Introduction
We aim to demonstrate the existing link between
genomics and bioethics by a reﬂection of applied
ethics that relies on the use of genomic tools.
Taking the case of cloned and/or transgenic ani-
mals, one can pose a philosophical question about
the identity of such animals, identity being deﬁned
philosophically as a permanence or a resistance to
external change. However, this deﬁnition is not suf-
ﬁcient to explain the particularity of these ‘new
beings’ [9]. A genomic approach that would anal-
yse the link between DNA structure and gene
expression, by comparing genomes, could supply
useful tools to clarify our understanding about
cloned animals. It should be very interesting to
build, on a scientiﬁc basis, some new philosoph-
ical questioning that could lead to the exploration
of new pathways in applied ethics.
The cloning technique is difﬁcult to classify
because cloned animals are generally not consid-
ered as genetically modiﬁed. We can only note
that cloning is a form of asexual reproduction that
is unnatural in mammals. Transgenesis, by con-
trast, consists of a manipulation of the genome.
Therefore, theoretical questions about the identity
of cloned animals and transgenic ones are quite dis-
tinct, even if these techniques are not necessarily
separate from a pragmatic point of view because
using cloning via cell transformation remains the
most proﬁtable way of producing transgenic ani-
mals in cow and goat. The existence of cloned
mammals obtained by nuclear transfer (which did
not exist 7 years ago), in our case bovine clones,
poses the problem of genetic identity in a different
way to that of inbred animals. The initial purpose
of cloning was to create genetically identical ani-
mals as so-called ‘good experimental models’, but
the question is, are they truly genetically identical?
In addition, given that cloned animals have a dif-
ferent methylation pattern, one can suggest that it
might be simplistic to assume that genetic identity
is the only form of identity to examine. To appre-
hend the issues around identity in an original but
scientiﬁc way, it is possible to use genomic tools
such as AFLP [17] to test both genetic identity and
methylation differences. Having scientiﬁc tools to
study the identity of cloned animals should allow
for improvement in the deﬁnition of these ‘new
animals’, and therefore stimulate a more concrete
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reﬂection integrating their scientiﬁc, social and eth-
ical status.
On the other hand, transgenesis poses the ques-
tion of the physical resistance between species.
This limit to manipulation could point to the exis-
tence of a species-speciﬁc identity.
These reﬂections lead us to two pragmatic ques-
tions: what is the utility of creating such new indi-
vidualities, and what is the responsibility of the
scientiﬁc community in such matters?
Materials and methods
How can we go about answering the question of the
identity of clones in a scientiﬁc way? If we consider
that clones have no pathology, can we assert that
they are normal and genetically identical, as they
are expected to be? If we assume that sequencing
the entire genome of each bovine clone is not fea-
sible, we can handle the question of identity by
using the AFLP technique [1] to study the genetic
variability of normal clones. In order to ﬁnd some
answers to the question of the identity of these
‘new animals’, we are comparing the genomes of
bovine clones derived from the same batch of cell
cultures at the French National Institute of Agro-
nomic Research (INRA). AFLP has not been tried
on twinned animals, therefore we do not yet have
an estimate of their degree of identity. Twins appear
naturally (post-fertilization) by a process of sponta-
neous embryonic scission; clones, by contrast, are
created by an artiﬁcial process before development,
which avoids fertilization [13]. Would genomes
originating from the same somatic genotype be
identical in terms of their linear DNA structure,
as are twins? The answer is normally ‘yes’ for
twins (except in cases where spontaneous muta-
tions occur), but needs to be tested particularly
regarding clones, since clones derive from different
nuclei that are artiﬁcially transferred into different
cytoplasms. Would clones and twins be identical
in terms of the function of their genome? Proba-
bly not, because of the differential methylation of
genes in a given local environment. This question
is particularly relevant regarding cloned animals
because of the existence of variations in DNA (loci)
methylation [11]. The questions of structural and
functional identity of clones have therefore to be
addressed in order to provide an estimate of the
degree of difference.
DNA from cells obtained from ear skin and cul-
tivated during one passage is puriﬁed with a DNA
extraction kit (Qiagen, San Diego, USA). DNA is
then digested with a rare site enzyme (EcoRI) and
a frequent one (TaqI) to generate thousands of frag-
ments of an average size of 256 bp. Each end of the
ampliﬁed fragments is ligated with double-strand
linkers to allow the ampliﬁcation of all fragments
with the same pair of primers. Two rounds of PCR
are performed with primers containing one to three
additional bases at each end, in order to reduce
the number of possible ampliﬁable fragments. This
allows the selective ampliﬁcation of only a part
of the fragment set corresponding to the speciﬁc
sequence of each combination of primers. To per-
mit the detection of ampliﬁed fragments on an
automatic sequencer, the rare cutter primer side
is ﬂuorescently labelled. Of the potential 15 × 109
fragments generated by digestion of the bovine
genome, only 50–150 will be detectable using each
primer combination. The 83 possible combinations
created by addition of 1–3 base pairs at the end
of the ampliﬁcation primers will provide access to
1%, at best, of the sequence information of the
genome in order to check for the presence of point
mutations or rearrangements. The AFLP technique
is particularly well adapted to the detection of vari-
ations within a species. One usually uses the pair
of primers that gives the highest number of differ-
ences, but our study requires the use of all possible
primer combinations to obtain the best information
about clone identity, even if it concerns only 1%
of the genome.
If some polymorphisms are detectable, this study
of the frequency of polymorphism in bovine
clones will lead to the following question: what
would the presence of a mutation between two
clones of the same genetic background — same
donor cell — signify? The possible presence of
detectable mutations [10] in cloned animals could
signify that these animals are not identical, as
they were supposed to be, and this, in turn, could
change our way of viewing the cloning technique.
The response to the question of knowing whether
cloning induces mutations depends on the results
we will obtain.
The use of a variant of the AFLP technique,
using a restriction enzyme sensitive to methylation
called MSAP [18,19], would be interesting to test
the epigenetic identity of clones by searching for
aberrant methylation patterns that, in abnormal
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animals, could be linked to problematic cloning and
associated pathologies [7].
Discussion
What are the existing ethical problems and
questioning about cloned and/or transgenic
animals, and what can we expect to learn
from this scientiﬁc approach?
We must realize that clones and transgenic animals
are not technological hypotheses, but concrete real-
ities that pose very peculiar problems because they
do not beneﬁt from the protection of any proper
legislation or ethics [2]. Until now, they have not
been taken into consideration by a research ethics
that has preferred action, instead of control, of
the biotechnology used. This proposed scientiﬁc
approach could help us to more precisely deﬁne
and build an ethical status for these ‘existing ani-
mals’ which should never be considered only as
‘hypothetical’ ones [15]. The pragmatic question
of what to do with cloned or transgenic animals
should be linked to the question of the legitimacy
of their conception and the issues around their liv-
ing conditions.
What are the concrete problems that have
arisen with existing cloned animals?
First, we must deal with a technical weakness.
Until now, bovine cloning, consisting of the fusion
between a somatic cell and an enucleated oocyte,
has had a very low success ratio of 1.5% (number
of calves born:reconstituted embryos [5]). The
problem is that it is difﬁcult to ﬁnd an explanation
for such a bad ratio. Hence, there remains a
‘grey area’ in the cloning technique that should
be clariﬁed, perhaps via scientiﬁc studies like ours,
which could serve as feedback on the technique.
This fuzzy technical context has heavy conse-
quences during the gestation period. As we do
not know how the nucleus is re-programmed,
we cannot foresee the physiological consequences
during embryo development [6]. Large offspring
syndrome (LOS) in calves is the main prag-
matic issue that scientists have to deal with
and that poses ethical problems [20]. The foe-
tus is indeed bigger than it should be and is
often characterized by an asynchronous develop-
ment of organs, e.g. enormous heart and kidneys,
and small lungs [4]. This syndrome, for which
scientists were not prepared because they have
not solved all the theoretical problems around
cloning, has resulted sometimes in catastrophes
such as the breakdown of the uterus of some sur-
rogate mothers. In this difﬁcult context, the reac-
tion of veterinarians and of animals caretakers
is empirical.
Until now, decisions have been made using a
cost vs. scientiﬁc interest balance. Creating cloned
calves is expensive — 1.8 times more than for
a calf produced using IVF [5] — and of great
scientiﬁc interest, so the main purpose is to keep
the foetus alive. This criterion is explicit, but there
is another criterion, which is only implicit, which is
the cost vs. animal suffering balance. In this case,
cost symbolizes the global ﬁnancial and scientiﬁc
value of the calf, and it is compared to the cost of
the surrogate mother’s suffering. The description
of what is usually done underlines the necessity of
making decisions within an ethical framework. In
this case, a conﬂict must be solved between two
aspects of animal ethics, which are pathocentrism
(where the value is the pain of the surrogate
mother) and biocentrism (where the value is the
life of the calf). On the other hand, we have to
think about the possibility of creating a new status
for bovine clones, because of their very particular
care and sanitary conditions, which are much better
than for other breeding animals.
Using genomic tools can perhaps lead, by clarify-
ing the identity of clones, to an explanation for the
weakness of the cloning technique and to an avoid-
ance of the appearance of abnormalities during the
development. Most importantly, it could allow a
rigorous reﬂection about the theoretical and, more
speciﬁcally, philosophical issues about the nature
of animals created through cloning.
What about the concrete problems that have
arisen due to the existence of transgenic
animals?
As we have already said, transgenesis poses a dif-
ferent theoretical problem from cloning itself. One
of the ideas would be to create producers of pro-
teins of therapeutic interest, e.g. in milk regarding
bovine species. However, it seems largely to be
premature to talk about therapeutic applications,
considering the technical problems that currently
occur (with the output ratio being extremely low).
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The case of transgenic animals reveals the difﬁ-
culty for a genome to tolerate the transfer of a
foreign gene, and we know there can sometimes
be severe consequences of the random insertion
of a transgene [16]. Transgenic animals cannot be
considered as mosaic organisms because they are
not normally made up of cells with different geno-
types derived from the same zygote [14], since they
are considered as transgenic only if their cells are
transgenic. A chimera is an organism that con-
sists of cells derived from more than one indi-
vidual; under this broad deﬁnition, transgenic ani-
mals could in some ways be considered as genetic
chimeras, because their genome is formed from
more than one genome. However, they are not cel-
lular chimeras, because chimera cells are usually
considered as being of different genotype and there-
fore chimeras are rather a subset of mosaics [14].
What could the difference be, then, between trans-
genic animals and animals that have undergone hor-
izontal gene transfers during evolution, and could
they be assimilated to chimeras? One answer could
be that only selected genes, which are useful and
do not cause a disturbance, have not been deleted
from organisms through evolution after horizon-
tal transfer. Through evolution, organisms have
time to react to, and to adapt to, inherited internal
changes, whereas the impact of a transgene, which
is global for the organism, and brutal, does not
allow for adaptation or further deletion. We could
say, therefore, that transgenic animals are not pro-
tected by the evolutionary processes of gene loss
and gain. The consequences of transgenesis on ani-
mals raise the question of speciﬁc identity, while
cloning consequences raise the question of individ-
ual and genetic identity. However, the existence of
transgenic animals is not only a theoretical subject,
and we can consequently ask the practical question:
what should be done with transgenic animals once
they have been created? One can wonder if sci-
entists always foresee the pragmatic consequences
of their scientiﬁc projects when dealing with engi-
neered animals, especially concerning mammals,
and a species loved by the public, such as the
bovine species.
In order to think about the conceptual issues of
transgenesis and cloning, we can rely on philo-
sophical concepts coming from Aristotle, such as
form — or essence — and matter; concepts that,
once reshaped, can help us to propose an explana-
tion of the importance of the principles of identity
and difference for an animal life. We could make
the hypothesis of the transmission through gener-
ations of a form that transports a certain degree
of identity and a certain degree of variation [12],
corresponding in some way to the transmission of
DNA and to the inheritance of epigenesis. Then the
philosophical question would be: do genetic manip-
ulation or cloning affect the essence — or iden-
tity — of an animal by introducing an abnormal
degree of identity or difference? In what concerns
us, we expect from our scientiﬁc study some new
ingredients to sketch an answer to the question of
identity concerning cloning.
We have the possibility now of summing up the
ethical issues concerning this study. We ﬁnd three
questions with different natures:
1. The ﬁrst question is an epistemological matter.
Six years after Dolly’s birth, there is a real
necessity, from an ethical point of view, for
scientiﬁc feedback on the cloning technique. It
would be important to be able to give, thanks to
genomic tools, the ‘raison d’ˆ etre’ — the object
(why) and goal (purpose) of what is done but
also of what is created, since we must remember
that we are talking about animals [3].
2. The second question is a question of animal
ethics: whilst the theoretical problems of cloning
and transgenesis on animals are still not solved,
they infer practical problems which are the sym-
bols of a technically and scientiﬁcally fuzzy
context. The ethical question is, therefore: are
cloned and transgenic animals supposed to bene-
ﬁt from a special ethical status, considering their
outstanding symbolic and scientiﬁc status?
3. The third question is about research ethics con-
cerning the use of mammals. Scientists ﬁnd it
difﬁcult to deﬁne and justify what they are cre-
ating because of the absence of a clear deﬁnition
of the status of these ‘new beings’ (which have
a concrete existence) and because of their rela-
tionship with those animals [8]. We may think
that the responsibility for thinking of the long-
term utility is required for scientists during the
construction of new projects. Helping to deﬁne
more precisely the identity of clones would con-
stitute a ﬁrst step towards this fulﬁlling this
responsibility.
As a conclusion, we could say that ethical approa-
ches should not be reduced solely to a ‘utilitaris-
tic approach’, i.e. a cost vs. beneﬁt ratio, and
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should take into account possible help coming from
the scientiﬁc area. Most of all, we insist on the
responsibility of the scientiﬁc community towards
the public. Scientists should not decide on their
own in matters, e.g. life issues, natural vs. engi-
neered animals, that concern the majority of human
beings. The paradox of the present matter is that
the resurgence of questioning about the relationship
between humans and animals emerges from the
area of engineered life itself. A genomic approach
used in order to improve philosophical reﬂection
seems to be a good way to illustrate the link
between genomics and bioethics.
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